Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by Voerding, Rita M.
Woman C.P.A. 
Volume 36 Issue 3 Article 3 
7-1974 
Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: Section 117 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 
Rita M. Voerding 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Voerding, Rita M. (1974) "Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954," Woman C.P.A.: Vol. 36 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa/vol36/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Woman C.P.A. by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please 
contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
Scholarship and Fellowship Grants
Section 117 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954
Rita M. Voerding
Cheyenne, Wyoming
The author discusses the tax effects of 
scholarships and fellowship grants.
Rita M. Voerding is an Internal Revenue 
Agent in Cheyenne, Wyoming and serves as 
Joint Compliance Coordinator for the State of 
Wyoming.
Ms. Voerding is a graduate of Boston Uni­
versity. She served in the Boston and the 
New Haven offices of the Internal Revenue 
Service and was the Internal Revenue Ser­
vice Renegotiation Officer of Rhode Island 
and Connecticut when she moved to the 
west. After several years as a partner and 
office manager for a construction firm she 
returned to the Internal Revenue Service in 
1966.
Ms. Voerding is a member of the Cheyenne 
Chapter of the American Society of Women 
Accountants.
Section 117(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code provides the general rule that gross 
income does not include any amount re­
ceived as a scholarship at an educational 
institution or as a fellowship grant. Sec­
tion 117(a) also excludes from income any 
amount received to cover expenses for 
travel, research, clerical help, or equip­
ment which are incident to the excludable 
scholarship or fellowship grant, but only 
to the extent that the amount is actually 
expended for these purposes.
In the case of individuals who are can­
didates for degrees, Section 117(b) places 
limitations on the general exclusions set 
forth in Section 117(a) by providing that 
these individuals cannot exclude from 
gross income that portion of a scholarship 
or fellowship grant which represents 
payment for research, teaching, or other 
services in the nature of part-time em­
ployment.
Section 117(b) also states if teaching, 
research, or other services are required of 
all candidates (whether or not recipients 
of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a 
particular degree as a condition to receiv­
ing such degree, such teaching, research, 
or other services, shall not be regarded as 
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part-time employment. It is this state­
ment in Section 117(b) and the similar 
statement in Regulations 1.117-2(a)(2) 
which has caused much confusion and 
resulted in the litigation of many cases 
involving candidates for degrees. The 
question here is whether the statement 
("If teaching, research, or other services 
are required of all candidates (whether or 
not recipients of scholarships or fellow­
ship grants) for a particular degree, such 
teaching, research, or other services shall 
not be regarded as part-time employ­
ment") is a "mechanical" test which, if 
met, would automatically exclude pay­
ments received as a scholarship or fellow­
ship.
It is the position of the Internal Revenue 
Service that this statement in Section 
117(b)(1) is not a mere "mechanical" test. 
The Internal Revenue Service believes 
that a "primary purpose" test must first 
be applied. It is our position that a proper 
reading of the statute requires that before 
the exclusion can apply, the payment 
sought to be excluded must have the nor­
mal characteristics associated with the 
terms "scholarship" and "fellowship".
The Internal Revenue Service feels the 
case of Elmer L. Reese, Jr. and Dorothy L. 
Reese, 45 T.C. 407(1966), affirmed 373 F. 
2d 742(1967), is a substantive importance. 
In this case, Dorothy L. Reese was a can­
didate for the degree of Master of Arts in 
teaching at Johns Hopkins University. All 
candidates for this degree were required 
to engage in "internship teaching" 
whereby the student took full responsibil­
ity for a classroom. To meet this require­
ment, Ms. Reese taught 20 hours a week 
in a public school in Baltimore County, 
Maryland, during the period February 1 
to June 30. She replaced a regular teacher 
and was paid $1,900 by the County Board 
of Education. Such amount was in accor­
dance with the salary scale for a teacher 
holding a Bachelor's Degree but not cer­
tified for teaching by the State.
The taxpayer contended that since con­
ferral of the degree was conditioned on 
her performance of teaching services, the 
amount received was excludable pur­
suant to Section 117(a) and 117(b)(1) of the 
Code. In the alternative, she contended 
that the teaching was primarily for the 
advancement of her skills as a teacher and 
not primarily for the benefit of the Board 
of Education, with the result that the 
payments were excludable under Section 
1.117-4(c) of the Regulations. The tax­
payer insisted in her first contention that 
in enacting Section 117(b)(1), Congress ef­
fectively established a "mechanical" test 
whereby amounts received for part-time 
services should be automatically excluded 
without regard to a "primary purpose" 
test. In disposing of this contention, the 
court delved into the legislative history of 
Section 117. The court pointed out that the 
House intended that there first be a schol­
arship or fellowship grant and then de­
creed that if part-time services were in­
volved the portion of the grant allocable 
thereto was to be included in gross in­
come. All the Senate did by adding a 
"new sentence" was to deal with the situ­
ation where a dual condition existed; ie, 
where the part-time services were re­
quired to obtain the degree and were also 
a prerequisite to receiving the scholar­
ship. In other words, in the Reese case, the 
court held that before the exclusion comes 
into play, there must first be a determina­
tion the payment has the normal charac­
teristics associated with the term "schol­
arship". Only if the amount received is a 
scholarship do the limitation and the ex­
ception thereto become operative. Stated 
differently, the Internal Revenue Service, 
in applying the law, looks to the provi­
sions of Section 117(a). The limitations in 
Section 117(b) are considered only after it 
is decided there is a scholarship or fellow­
ship grant involved.
In the case of Donald R. DiBona, T.C. 
Memo 1968-214, the taxpayer was a can­
didate for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Iowa State University. He 
received a teaching assistantship for the 
academic year. He did not teach the first 
three months of the,appointment because 
of a lack of student interest in the course. 
However, during that period, he began 
preparations to teach the following quar­
ter and occasionally gave demonstrations 
and performed services with regard to 
other formal courses. When he began 
teaching, during the winter quarter, his 
class met for two afternoons a week. Dur­
ing the year for which he received the 
assistantship, the University did not im­
pose a minimum teaching requirement 
on every graduate candidate as a condi­
tion to receiving the Ph.D. Degree. How­
ever, his main professor made it under­
stood that all students under his supervi­
sion and control would have to teach at 
least one quarter.
In holding the primary purpose of the 
payments was compensation for services, 
the Tax Court noted the following items: 
(1) the number of teaching assistantships 
was dependent on the need for teachers 
and availability of funds, not financial 
need; (2) taxpayer understood from the 
beginning of the fall quarter that he was to 
be paid for services rendered; (3) the 
source of funds was the general university 
budget which is used to pay all professors 
and instructors, Iowa State University did 
not have authority to grant fellowships 
from these funds; (4) the department 
chairman generally treated all teaching 
assistants in the department as employees 
and Iowa State University believed that 
an employer-employee relationship ex­
isted between each teaching assistant and 
the University; and (5) Iowa State Univer­
sity withheld Federal income tax from the 
payments.
In the cases of Edward A. and Suzanne 
M. Jamieson, 51 T.C. 635(1969), and Robert 
N. and Svaja V. Worthington, T.C. Memo 
1972-111, the Tax Court applied a "prim­
ary" purpose test in concluding amounts 
paid to teaching assistants were compen­
sation.
In the cases of Chander P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 
13(1960), and Robert H. Steiman, 56 T.C. 
1350(1971), the Tax Court held the 
petitioners were entitled to exclude 
amounts received as scholarships or fel­
lowship grants. However, the Internal 
Revenue Service does not feel these cases 
represent an erosion of the standards set 
forth in the Reese case, since the court 
seemed to agree the "primary" purpose 
test was the controlling rule of law. In the 
Steiman case, the court expressly adopted 
the holding in Reese but determined that 
the payments to the petitioners had satis­
fied the criteria mandated by Reese.
In summary, the Internal Revenue Ser­
vice will apply the rationale advanced in 
the Reese, Jamieson, DiBona, and 
Worthington cases in determining if 
amounts paid for teaching, research or 
other services qualify as .scholarships or 
fellowship grants. If it is concluded the 
amounts paid to the recipient are for work 
rather than study, then such amounts will 
be included in income even though such 
teaching, research, or other services are 
required of all candidates for the degree.
We would also like to comment on the 
Supreme Court decision in the case of 
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741(1969). In this case, 
three individuals held engineering posi­
tions at the Bettis Atomic Power Labora­
tory in Pittsburgh. The laboratory is 
owned by the Government and is oper­
ated by Westinghouse under a contract 
with the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Under Westinghouse's educational pro­
gram, when employees have completed 
all preliminary requirements for the 
doctorate, they may apply for an educa­
tional leave of absence. They must submit 
a proposed dissertation topic for approval 
by Westinghouse and the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Approval is based on a de­
termination the topic has at least some 
general relevance to the work done at Bet­
tis. If the leave of absence is secured, the 
employees devote their full attention, or­
dinarily for a nine month period, to fulfil­
ling their dissertation requirements. Dur­
ing this period, employees receive a 
stipend in an amount based on a specified 
percentage (from 70 to 90 percent) of their 
prior salary. They also retain their senior­
ity status and receive all employee ben­
efits, such as insurance and stock option 
privileges. In return, they must not only 
submit periodic progress reports, but 
under the written agreement that all par­
ticipants must sign, they are obligated to 
return to the employ of Westinghouse for 
a period of at least two years following the 
completion of their leave. The taxpayers 
involved in this case took leaves under the 
Westinghouse program and eventually 
received their doctorate degrees. They 
claimed the stipends received were non- 
taxable under Section 117 of the Code.
The Supreme Court reasoned Congress 
did not intend to exclude all payments 
from an individual's income however 
large or whatever their source, simply be­
cause they happened to assist him or her 
while in school. The court made it clear 
that where a person is paid by his or her 
employer while in school as part of a bar­
gain whereby the individual in turn 
agrees to work for the grantor, the pay­
ments are essentially compensation and 
should not be excluded as scholarship 
funds.
It is interesting to note that the Tax 
Court of the United States quoted the case 
of Johnson in the J.E. MacDonald case, 52 
T.C. 386(1969). The Tax Court held that 
payments received by Mr. J.E. Mac­
Donald from his employer (I.B.M.) while 
pursuing studies at a university were 
compensation and were not excludable 
from gross income as a scholarship or fel­
lowship. The Tax Court felt the rationale 
advanced in Johnson applied even though 
the taxpayer was not legally obligated to 
return to his job at I .B .M. or to reimburse 
I.B.M. The court concluded the fact that 
I.B.M. expected the taxpayer to return to 
work was sufficient to bring the case 
within the scope of the Johnson decision.
The Internal Revenue Service will, of 
course, apply the principles established 
in the Johnson case when determining if 
amounts paid are compensation for ser­
vices or primarily for the benefit of the 
grantor (Regulations 1.117-4(c)).
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